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INTRODUCTION
People who are politically “conservative” or “libertarian” in the
way those terms are often deployed in contemporary American public
discourse almost universally regard the Patient Protection and Afford1
able Care Act (PPACA) as objectionable and, in a related but distinct
vein, unconstitutional. The favorite focus of such conservative and libertarian protest is the Act’s so-called individual mandate—the requirement that individuals buy health insurance from a private mar†

Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professor of Law, and John F. Scarpa Chair,
Villanova University School of Law. I am grateful to the editors of the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review for their invitation to participate in their Symposium, “The
New American Health Care System: Reform, Revolution, or Missed Opportunity,” for
their warm hospitality on the occasion, and for their fine editing. I am also grateful to
Professors Ted Ruger and Mark Hall for their probing but encouraging questions during and after the Symposium. Ethan Townsend and Emily Rasmussen provided helpful research assistance.
1
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).

(1623)
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2

ket. As of the time of writing, federal district courts in Florida and
Virginia have held the Act unconstitutional on account of the individ3
ual mandate. In each case Republican presidents had appointed the
4
district judge. The two district judges that have upheld the Act
5
against constitutional challenge were appointed by Democratic presi6
dents. Regardless of whether one approaches the issue from the right,
the left, or the middle, however, the individual mandate merits a hard
look: a statutory requirement that an individual spend his or her money on health insurance unsettles many entrenched American moral, political, and legal expectations. Whether this requirement does so for
good or for ill remains to be seen.
The conservative and libertarian objections to the individual
mandate implicate some of the deepest and most contested questions
concerning our Constitution, constitutionalism in general, and the relation of positive law—including constitutional law—to the ends of
good government. It is no exaggeration to say that it even implicates
questions about who we are. Professor Randy Barnett has recently argued that the mandate raises questions about the sovereignty of “We
7
the People.” Specifically, Barnett contends that the mandate is unconstitutional because it violates the people’s sovereignty by “comman8
deering” them into buying health insurance. Why, one must therefore
ask, is it wrong for a government to commandeer its own people?
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) first defines commandeer as
9
“to command or force into military service,” which is not something
the Act assays. The OED further defines commandeer as “to take arbi10
trary possession of.” But who can possibly contend that the individual mandate, whatever its perceived merits or demerits, is an “arbitrary”
act by Congress? It was instead deeply deliberate. Perhaps Barnett’s

2

PPACA § 1501, 42 U.S.C.A § 18091 (West. Supp. 1B 2010).
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-0091, 2011
WL 285683, at *33 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728
F. Supp. 2d 768, 782 (E.D. Va. 2010).
4
See Kevin Sack, Federal Judge Rules That Health Law Violates Constitution, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2011, at A1.
5
Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 10-0015, 2010 WL 4860299, at *11 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30,
2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 891-95 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
6
See Sack, supra note 4.
7
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
8
Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance
Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 586-87 (2011).
9
3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 542 (2d ed. 1989).
10
Id.
3
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objection is better phrased as the government commanding citizens to
take this particular action? Is it not, however, part of the essential
function of government to command people on certain matters?
In what follows, I will suggest that Barnett’s position depends
upon a reading of our moral, political, and legal traditions of understanding that is both debatable and, in fact, mistaken. I will suggest,
moreover, that as we gradually make and remake American politicolegal culture, as we necessarily do from one season to the next, we
would do best to acknowledge and live within a creative tension regarding the work required of the civil ruling authority. This paradigm
requires, in turn, foregoing the cheap fictions of sovereignty that, alas,
stud contemporary and historical Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Why a “creative tension?” On the one hand, we cannot reasonably
assume that the government that governs least is best; government can
deliver some important human goods more efficiently, and there are
still other goods that government alone can provide. On the other
hand, we cannot reasonably presume that government can solve all
problems; there are some human goods that individuals or private
groups can better or uniquely achieve. The nature and extent of government action properly vary across time and circumstance, and thus,
so do the very forms of government itself. Always, however, determining what role government should play in particular times and places
precludes absolutism—the absolutism of imagined popular, individual,
or state “sovereignty.” This determination also precludes the stealth absolutism of some forms of “originalism” in constitutional interpretation.
I. SETTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINAL CONTEXT
The individual mandate invites constitutional scrutiny on any
number of grounds, but the focus here will be its constitutional status
vis-à-vis the Commerce Clause in conjunction with the Necessary and
Proper Clause. The focus, more specifically, will be its status under
11
the Commerce Clause as currently construed. As such—with a possible exception to be noted below—the mandate must be sustainable, if
at all, as a regulation of economic activity that works a “substantial ef12
fect” on interstate commerce. Under United States v. Lopez, there are
three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its
commerce power. First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels
11

The mandate’s status under any number of possible “originalist” or other interpretations will for now be put to the side.
12
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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of interstate commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only
from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation
to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect inter13
state commerce.

Plainly, if the individual mandate is sustainable under the Commerce
Clause, it would be thanks to the third prong of the Lopez test—regulation
of activity that has a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce.
Unlike the first two prongs of the Lopez test, the substantial effects
test is not, according to Barnett, the product of an interpretation of
14
the Commerce Clause. Rather, according to Barnett, the substantial
effects test is correctly interpreted as an application of the Necessary
and Proper Clause “in the context of the regulation of interstate
15
commerce.” While others view the matter differently—believing that
the Court has expanded the very meaning of “commerce” since the
16
New Deal —I will simply stipulate to Barnett’s position here. The
presence of the Necessary and Proper Clause as a link in the chain of
argument provides Barnett with the textual predicate for his argument: the individual mandate is unconstitutional because it violates
our sovereignty.
According to Barnett, a regulation of economic activity is constitu17
tionally permissible provided that it is both necessary and proper. If
one were to treat “necessary” and “proper” either as a unit or as an instance of pleonasm, what is necessary would also necessarily be proper. If each word is given its own meaning, however, what is necessary

13

Id. at 558-59 (internal citations omitted).
See Barnett, supra note 8, at 593 (“Therefore, all future cases applying this doctrine are not, strictly speaking, ‘Commerce Clause cases.’”).
15
See id. (citing J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 619); see also Michael Paulsen & Randy Barnett, Debate
on the Original Meaning of the Commerce, Spending, and Necessary and Proper Clauses, (Barnett, Statement) (discussing the history and later expansion of the Necessary and
Proper Clause) in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 262-73 (Steven Calabresi ed., 2007). Because the Clause was added to the Constitution by the Committee of
Detail, without any previous discussion in the Constitutional Convention, it has proved
especially difficult for originalists to settle on its meaning. Paulsen & Barnett, supra.
16
See Barnett, supra note 8, at 587-89 (describing the “law professors’ understanding” of the expanding Commerce Clause).
17
See id. at 590-93 (explaining how the Supreme Court expanded the Commerce
Clause doctrine to include the Necessary and Proper Clause).
14
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must also be proper to withstand a challenge to its constitutionality.
19
Barnett makes a strong case for giving each word its own bite. In
Barnett’s view, there are right ways (proper) and wrong ways (improper) of regulating those activities that have a substantial effect on in20
terstate commerce (necessary). I will say more shortly about the demands of “proper,” but first there is a further reason why this question
that so rarely gets asked—What is “proper” regulation?—is apt.
That further reason involves a legal argument that seems to be
picking up steam, though it still lacks a majority vote in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. While conditionally conceding that the
mandate must meet the “economic activity” test of Lopez and its progeny, some proponents of the mandate have also recently defended it
on an alternative ground. Specifically, they contend that although not
itself regulation of an economic act, the mandate is nonetheless constitutional because it is part of a larger regulatory scheme that is neces21
sary and proper to the regulation of interstate commerce.
These proponents have on their side not only dicta and implicatures of Lopez itself, but also language from the majority opinion of
22
the more recent case Gonzales v. Raich. Additionally, Justice Scalia
explicitly developed this theory in his concurring opinion in the same
case: “As we implicitly acknowledged in Lopez . . . Congress’s authority
to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate
commerce is not limited to laws directed against economic activities
23
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”
Although the Court has yet to adopt Justice Scalia’s theory that
Congress’s power to regulate is not confined to economic activity, one
can reasonably question how the individual mandate would fare under Scalia’s theory. If one concedes that the mandate itself is not a
18

See id. at 621 (“The Necessary and Proper Clause requires that laws be ‘proper’
as well.”).
19
See id. at 621-26 (arguing that both “Necessary” and “Proper” should be afforded
proper weight by judges); see also Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope
of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 271
(1993) (“We submit that the word ‘proper’ serves a critical, although previously largely
unacknowledged, constitutional purpose . . . .”).
20
See Barnett, supra note 8, at 624 (describing decisions in which Justices have distinguished between proper and improper means of regulation).
21
Cf. id. at 614-18 (acknowledging but rejecting the argument that the individual
mandate is constitutional because it rests within a broader regulatory framework).
22
545 U.S. 1 (2005). The Court found the Controlled Substances Act to be constitutional because it was part of a broad regulatory framework, unlike the statutes declared unconstitutional in Lopez and United States v. Morrison. Id. at 23-26.
23
Id. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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regulation of economic activity but is nonetheless “necessary” because
it is essential to a broader scheme of regulation of interstate commerce, then there remains a further question to be asked: is it a
“proper” means by which Congress may exercise its power over interstate commerce? According to the enduring test set out by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland: “Let the end be legitimate, let
it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are con24
stitutional.” As parsed by Barnett, this sentence establishes that a
means is proper when it is, first, not prohibited and, second, otherwise
25
consistent “with the letter and spirit of the constitution.”
Accepting for present purposes this understanding of the requirements of what it means to be “proper,” is the individual mandate
proper? Assuming it is not forbidden, does it yet “consist with the let26
ter and spirit of the constitution?”
In order to establish that it does not so consist, Barnett next invokes the recent line of “anti-commandeering” cases, which hold that
27
Congress cannot “commandeer” the states in certain respects. For
the definitional reason mentioned at the outset, this line of cases
seems to operate under a misnomer: military service is not involved,
and there is no hint that the congressional commands at issue are arbitrary. Definitional concerns aside, it has long been established that
the Supremacy Clause requires that state judges can be “comman28
deered” to follow federal law. The principle that Congress cannot
29
commandeer state legislative or executive actions is of more recent
30
vintage and of questionable strength. There is also the question of

24

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
Barnett, supra note 8, at 621.
26
Id.
27
See id. at 626-27 (“As we have seen, the anti-commandeering cases that limit the
commerce power of Congress were ultimately grounded by the Supreme Court in the
text of the Tenth Amendment.”).
28
See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392, 394 (1947) (holding that state courts cannot
refuse to enforce federal law absent a “valid excuse”).
29
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992).
30
Saikrishna Prakash has defended the view that the Framers were hostile to national commandeering of state legislatures because they are “sovereign,” but open to
national commandeering of state magistracy. Saikrishna Prakash, Field Office Federalism,
79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1961-62 (1993). Evan Caminker maintains that the Framers expected Congress to be able to commandeer state legislatures as well as state executive and
25
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whether the principle has more than an “attenuated” basis in the
31
Tenth Amendment. Nevertheless, the relevant aspects of the anticommandeering cases are familiar.
In the first such case, New York v. United States, the Court struck
down Congress’s attempt to use its commerce power to mandate that
any state that refused to enter into interstate compacts to dispose of
32
nuclear waste must itself take title to the nuclear waste. In her opinion for the Court, Justice O’Connor explained that “the Constitution
has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to
33
require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”
Justice O’Connor characterized Congress’s instructions to the states
as unconstitutional “commandeering”: “Congress may not simply
‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly com34
pelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’”
In New York, the Court held that “‘the Act commandeers the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program,’ an outcome that has never been
understood to lie within the authority conferred upon Congress by
35
the Constitution.”
Five years later, Congress used its commerce power to mandate
that local sheriffs run background checks on gun buyers. In Printz v.
United States, the Supreme Court held that this, too, was an improper
36
commandeering of state officials. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia recognized a principle of state sovereignty underlying several pro37
visions of the Constitution, but he relied primarily on the Tenth
Amendment:
judicial officials. Evan Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1042-50 (1995).
31
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 444 (2010) (describing the “rule against federal ‘commandeering’ of state legislatures or executive officers” as “loosely associated with the
Tenth Amendment”).
32
505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
33
Id. at 162.
34
Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S.
264, 288 (1981)).
35
Id. at 176 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
36
521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
37
These provisions included:
the prohibition on any involuntary reduction or combination of a State’s territory, Art. IV, § 3; the Judicial Power Clause, Art. III, § 2, and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, Art. IV, § 2, which speak of the “Citizens” of the States; the
amendment provision, Article V, which requires the votes of three-fourths of
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Residual state sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the Constitution’s conferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers, but only
discrete, enumerated ones, Art. I, § 8, which implication was rendered
express by the Tenth Amendment’s assertion that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”38

In sum, wrote Justice Scalia, “The Federal Government may neither
issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems,
nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. . . .
[S]uch commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitu39
tional system of dual sovereignty.”
Responding to the argument that this statutory directive was “necessary and proper” for Congress to effectuate its commerce power,
Justice Scalia memorably described the Necessary and Proper Clause
as “the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional
40
action.” He went on to assert that when a law enacted pursuant to
the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the Tenth Amendment and other constitutional provisions,
“it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce
Clause,’ and is thus, in the words of The Federalist, ‘merely [an] ac[t]
41
of usurpation’ which ‘deserve[s] to be treated as such.’”
After marshalling additional evidence that the Court’s constitutional prohibition on federal commandeering of states is rooted above
all in the Tenth Amendment, Barnett makes his decisive next move,
which is to note that the Tenth Amendment reserves undelegated
powers not just to the states, but “to the states respectively, or to the
42
people.” He continues:
As Justice Thomas has written, the Tenth Amendment “avoids taking any
position on the division of power between the state governments and the
people of the States”—a position he reasserted just last term in his dissenting opinion in Comstock in which Justice Scalia joined. In this way, the text
43
of the Tenth Amendment recognizes popular as well as state sovereignty.

the States to amend the Constitution; and the Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, § 4.
Id. at 919.
38
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X).
39
Id. at 935.
40
Id. at 923.
41
Id. at 923-24 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton)
(E.H. Scott ed., 1898)).
42
Barnett, supra note 8, at 627 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added)).
43
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Barnett’s syllogism is straightforward: just as Congress cannot commandeer states because they are sovereign, so too Congress cannot
commandeer the people because they are sovereign. Therefore, the individual mandate, which surely “commandeers”—that is, commands—
individuals by making them spend their money on health insurance, is
unconstitutional.
Maybe, but maybe not. What could it possibly mean to assert that
the Tenth Amendment—or anything else?—makes people or states
“sovereign?” Saying it is so does not make it so. The question of
whether the predication at issue is true cannot be answered in an historical or linguistic vacuum. Smooth though Barnett’s syllogism is,
there are reasons to question the validity of the premise that “We the
People” are sovereign, and therefore not amenable to being commandeered. The argument from sovereignty proves too much, and
thus proves nothing. It is a problem of too many “sovereigns,” and
therefore, of none at all.
II. MULTIPLYING SOVEREIGNS
The linguistic antecedent of the English word “sovereignty” traces
to fourteenth-century French, where in common—and sometimes legal—parlance the word referred to any official endowed with superior
44
force. It did not mean freedom from all superior ruling authority
and a complete self-determination and independence of judgment.
Over time, however, “[s]uch was the idea, and the purpose for which
45
the word Sovereignty was coined.” In the modern period, a claim to
“sovereignty” veers, like a car out of alignment, in the direction of being a claim to complete independence and freedom from all interference with possible self-determination. In the contending historical
claims of contest to emerge from the medieval social hierarchy of
Christendom, to claim sovereignty was to deny all dependence or subordination. Those who today claim or assert sovereignty—whether
they be nation-states, states, tribes, churches, or individuals—are essentially saying, “You’re not the boss of me.” Nations claiming sovereignty deny that other nations have the authority to rule them; states
and tribal nations claiming sovereignty insist upon their own freedom
of self-determination; and so forth.
Some claims to self-determination are commendable, indeed necessary. The brute assertion of power over another—whether that
44
45

JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 38 n.31 (1951).
Id. at 37-38.
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other be a nation-state, a tribe, a church, a state, or an individual—is
not legitimate. Power must be justified if it is to be legitimate. There
are times when it is morally exigent to deny another’s claims to exercise ruling power, and a claim to be “sovereign” is one historically attested, if blunt, way to make just such a denial. Still, no one except
the anarchist denies that some exertions of power over another are
indeed legitimate. Somebody has to be the boss or else we would have
no governance, no order, and none of the human goods that can only
accrue thanks to order. This point is not one of sophisticated political
theory, logic, or even debate. No group or its members can long exist,
let alone prosper, without some measure of relatively stable agree46
ment about who is in charge, and of what. It is the work of politics
and political philosophy (and perhaps theology) to draw the lines
concerning who is properly the boss of whom, and concerning what.
The Framers drafted and ratified the Constitution against a background of fierce debate about the location of sovereignty and, specifi47
cally, the transference of sovereignty from Parliament to the people.
The Articles of Confederation imputed sovereignty to each of the thir48
teen colonies. Even after the Constitution had been ratified, James
Madison sought unsuccessfully to have recognition of the people’s so49
To our Constitution as
vereignty “prefixed to the constitution.”

46

As Yves Simon has argued, even a perfectly virtuous group of people would require what he refers to as the essential function of authority, namely, the coordination,
for example, of which side of the road one is to drive on. YVES R. SIMON, A GENERAL
THEORY OF AUTHORITY 57-60 (2009). Simon further argued that,
Even in the smallest and most closely united community, unity of action cannot be taken for granted; it has to be caused, and, if it is to be steady, it has to
be assured a steady cause. . . . Now unity of action depends upon unity of
judgment, and unity of judgment can be procured either by way of unanimity
or by way of authority; no third possibility is conceivable.
YVES R. SIMON, PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 19 (1951).
47
See, e.g., EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 56 (1988) (contending,
convincingly, that the concept of sovereignty was developed in England in opposition
to the divine rights of kings). On the role of imagination in making the people sovereign, see PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 189 (1997). On the historical process by which the English
Parliament became “sovereign,” see generally JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY (1999).
48
See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II (“Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence . . . .”).
49
Madison Resolution ( June 8, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 11 (Helen E. Veit et
al. eds., 1991).
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enacted, ratified, and handed down, however, the term “sovereignty”
is wholly foreign: the word simply does not appear in the document.
Despite that deafening constitutional silence, our constitutional
jurisprudence is thick with the concept of sovereignty. Indeed, a brief
inspection of the evidence reveals that the Supreme Court tries to
solve some of the nation’s most important socio-legal questions by
multiplying predications of sovereignty and applying them to just
about all comers. One can hardly blame Barnett for resorting to argument that sounds in sovereignty: contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence would make practically everybody except the family dog a
sovereign. Ironically, such jurisprudence ultimately makes the Court
the closest thing to a true sovereign, because it is the Court that has
final say over which “sovereign” will prevail in which contests. But this
gets ahead of things.
Although the term “sovereign” does not appear in the Constitution, it entered our constitutional jurisprudence early, and with a ven50
geance, in the celebrated 1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia. In its first
big constitutional case, the Supreme Court declined to order the dismissal of Chisholm’s suit against Georgia in federal court for money
51
damages. The Court disagreed with Georgia’s argument that it was a
sovereign state clothed with the sovereign’s traditional immunity to
52
suit without its consent.
The Chisholm Court’s jurisdictional decision was promptly overruled by the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, of course, but the
theory that the states were sovereign was just getting started. Although the Eleventh Amendment speaks only of the federal courts
53
lack of jurisdiction over suits against states by citizens of other states,
since 1890 and the decision in Hans v. Louisiana, the Court has “understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it
says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms: that the States
54
entered into the federal system with their sovereignty intact.” After a
50

2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend XI.
51
Id. at 479.
52
See id. (“[A] state is suable by citizens of another state . . . .”).
53
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
54
Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (citing Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)). For a chronicle of the American jurisprudential history
of sovereignty, see Patrick McKinley Brennan, Against Sovereignty: A Cautionary Note on
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century of incremental growth and occasional recession, that presupposition came to full flower in a trinity of cases decided over a span of
55
seven years by the Rehnquist Court: Seminole Tribe v. Florida, Alden v.
56
Maine, and Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports Authori57
ty. In these cases the Court found that states were immune to unconsented private suits for money damages in, respectively, federal court,
state court, and federal administrative tribunals. In each case the
ground was the same, namely, the “presupposition” that Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated boldly in Seminole: “each State is a sovereign entity in
58
our federal system.”
These declarations of the sovereignty of the states presuppose, however, the contending claim that the United States—the nation—is sovereign. How can there be two sovereigns in the same place at the same
time? Does this not vitiate the very concept of sovereignty: freedom
from all higher ruling authority and complete independence? This is exactly the problem the Framers set out to solve, and they persuaded
59
many, including Justice Anthony Kennedy, that they succeeded.
In the late eighteenth century, political theorists derided the idea
of an imperium in imperio (an empire within an empire), frequently
60
terming it a “solecism.” In his well-known concurrence in U.S. Term
Limits v. Thornton, Justice Kennedy undertook to dissolve the lingering
appearance of solecism by the use of metaphor: “[t]he Framers split
61
the atom of sovereignty.” Five years later, in his opinion for the
Court in Alden v. Maine, Justice Kennedy switched descriptive gears,
62
explaining that the United States enjoys “primary sovereignty,” whe63
reas the states enjoy a “residuary and inviolable sovereignty.”

the Normative Power of the Actual, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 181, 195-204 (2006), which
summarizes the “conventional” view of Eleventh Amendment sovereignty.
55
See 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (granting sovereign immunity to Florida in a suit by
an Indian tribe in federal court).
56
See 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999) (explaining how states retain sovereignty in their
own courts against their own citizens).
57
See 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002) (extending the Seminole Tribe reasoning to administrative tribunals).
58
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54.
59
See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
60
See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 14
(2010).
61
514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
62
527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999).
63
Id. at 715 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 214 ( James Madison) (E.H. Scott
ed., 1898)).
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Even this impressive multiplication of sovereigns hardly exhausts
the roster. Way back in Chisholm, the seriatim opinions of Chief Justice John Jay and Justice James Wilson rejected the sovereignty of the
states on the very basis of the sovereignty of the people. Chief Justice
Jay wrote that “at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the
64
people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country.” Justice
Wilson, who had written and lectured on the concept of sovereignty
(including in his famed Lectures on Law at the University of Pennsyl65
vania) in the period before Chisholm was decided, was ripe to the task
in his opinion in the case:
To the Constitution of the United States the term SOVEREIGN, is totally unknown.
There is but one place where it could have been used with propriety. But, even
in that place it would not, perhaps, have comported with the delicacy of
those, who ordained and established that Constitution. They might have
announced themselves “SOVEREIGN” people of the United States: But se66
renely conscious of the fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration.

In his remarks in the Pennsylvania Convention to Ratify the Constitution of the United States in 1787, Wilson opposed those who were absolutists about the sovereignty of the states under the Articles of Confederation, arguing “that, in this country, the supreme, absolute, and
67
uncontrollable power resides in the people at large.”
This is a thick concept of sovereignty indeed, and it is this that
provides Barnett with the premise necessary to his syllogism: “[I]n affirming the underlying principle of state sovereignty within the federal system, the Supreme Court has never repudiated its early affirmation of popular sovereignty in Chisholm. . . . [I]f imposing mandates on
state legislatures and executives intrudes improperly into state sovereignty, might mandating the people improperly infringe on popular
68
sovereignty?” Barnett’s answer is yes, in support of which he also
quotes Yick Wo v. Hopkins, in which the Court explained that “in our

64

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793).
See James Wilson, Of the Constitutions of the United States and of Pennsylvania—Of
the Legislative Department, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 829-32 (Kermit L.
Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007); James Wilson, Of the General Principles of Law, in 1
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra, at 494-99; James Wilson, Of Municipal Law,
in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra, at 549-58, 567-70, 572-78; James Wilson, Of The Study of Law in the United States, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON,
supra, at 443-46.
66
Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 454.
67
James Wilson, Remarks in the Pennsylvania Convention to Ratify the Constitution of the
United States, 1787, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 65, at 215.
68
Barnett, supra note 8, at 629.
65

BRENNAN REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1636

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

6/11/2011 7:31 PM

[Vol. 159: 1623

system, while sovereign powers are delegated to agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for
69
whom all government exists and acts.”
National, state, and popular pretensions to sovereignty already
dazzle the analytic mind. Even this swelling collection of “sovereigns,”
however, does not exhaust the contest for complete independence.
Justice Wilson did not maintain only that the people en bloc are sovereign. The people can be sovereign, according to Wilson, because each
individual is an “original sovereign” who can aggregate himself with
70
other original sovereigns to create “a collection of original sovereigns.”
Under modern Supreme Court jurisprudence, moreover, every
individual approximates a sovereign in a sense more impressive than
Wilson ever could have imagined. That jurisprudence recognizes the
individual’s right to live by his own norms, subject only—so far as appears—to the constitutional limit of the Millean harm principle, the
idea, that is, that “the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any
71
of their number, is self-protection.” According to Mill and his followers, “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
72
sufficient warrant.” While the Court did not mention either sovereignty or Mill by name in Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Court struck
down a Texas statute that criminalized “deviate sexual intercourse
73
with another individual of the same sex,” the case has been widely
celebrated as a recognition of the right of individuals to be “selfnorming,” limited only by the harm principle.

69

Id. (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 456 (1793).
71
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 80 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale
Univ. Press 2003) (1859).
72
Id. “John Stuart Mill argued in effect that the harm principle is the only valid
principle for determining legitimate invasions of liberty, so that no conduct that fails
to satisfy its terms can properly be made criminal.” 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 11 (1984). Occasionally and as an afterthought, however, Mill seems to include the additional category of “offense” within
the scope of the criminal law. See MILL, supra note 71, at 160 (“[T]here are many acts
which, being directly injurious only to the agents themselves, ought not to be legally
interdicted, but which, if done publicly . . . may rightfully be prohibited.”).
73
539 U.S. 558, 563, 578-79 (2003) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a)
(West 2003)).
70
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In fact, Barnett has been among the leading champions of such a
74
reading of Lawrence. Another, more critical commentator summed
up this reading of Lawrence as follows:
In Lawrence . . . the Court in effect held, in agreement with and at the
urging of the libertarian Cato Institute, that the Constitution does enact
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty. The result, if consistently followed, would
be to presume unconstitutional all laws limiting “liberty,” i.e., substantially all laws, and put on the states or national government the burden of
justifying them. As a corollary of this philosophic position and illustrating
its potential, the Court explicitly rejected traditional standards of morali75
ty as a means of meeting the government’s burden of justification.

To fill in the unstated but operative intermediate premise in Lawrence,
one need only quote the language of Mill’s On Liberty itself: “Over
76
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”
In sum, under current American constitutional jurisprudence,
“sovereignty” is predicated either explicitly or implicitly of four very
different entities: the nation, each state, the people, and the individ77
ual. Given this diversity, one can safely concede that the concept
signified by the word “sovereign” is not univocal. In exactly what
sense, then, is each of these very different entities “sovereign?” What
is it to be possessed of “sovereignty?”
III. MAKING SOME SENSE OF SOVEREIGNTY
Predications of sovereignty abound and multiply in contemporary
culture, but the concept of sovereignty is associated with no one more
than it is with Thomas Hobbes, a man whose political theory terrified
78
many of his contemporaries. By “sovereignty,” Hobbes meant the
powers of nothing short of a “mortal god”:

74

See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas,
2002–2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 35-36 (2003) (arguing that Lawrence was “potentially
revolutionary” because it required government “to justify its restriction on liberty”
without declaring homosexual sex to be a fundamental right).
75
Lino A. Graglia, Lawrence v. Texas: Our Philosopher-Kings Adopt Libertarianism as
Our Official National Philosophy and Reject Traditional Morality as a Basis for Law, 65 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1139, 1140 (2004).
76
MILL, supra note 71, at 81.
77
While not entirely relevant here, there is actually a fifth category of “sovereign”
under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, the tribal nation. See generally ROBERT
ODAWI PORTER, SOVEREIGNTY, COLONIALISM AND THE INDIGENOUS NATIONS: A READER 3-230 (2005).
78
The reception of Leviathan was by no means uniform, however. See G.A.J. Rogers, Hobbes and His Contemporaries (noting that some of Hobbes’s positions “attracted a
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[T]he multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMONWEALTH, in
Latin CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather
(to speak more reverently) of that Mortal God to which we owe, under the
Immortal God, our peace and defence. For by this authority, given him by
every particular man in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much
power and strength conferred on him that by terror thereof, he is
enabled to conform the wills of them all to peace at home and mutual
aid against their enemies abroad. . . .
And he that carrieth this person, is called SOVEREIGN, and said to
79
have Sovereign Power ; and everyone besides, his SUBJECT.

As Philip Pettit has pointed out,
Hobbes is conscious that this doctrine of more or less absolute sovereign
authority may seem incredible when applied to individual monarchs . . . .
He therefore tries to make a general case for the absolute extent of sovereignty by insisting that the rights that seem natural in the case of a
wholly democratic sovereign—if indeed they do seem natural—must be
80
ascribed on parallel grounds to a sovereign of any kind.

On Hobbes’s account, to be sovereign is to be bound by no law—
neither laws of one’s own making, nor even the divine natural law. As
Pettit underscores, “the sovereign may behave toward subjects in a way
81
that breaches natural law.”
Hobbes’s is not the only canonical account of what it means to be
sovereign. When Jean Bodin clarified—and, in important respects,
standardized—the nature of sovereignty three-quarters of a century
earlier, the focal meaning was instructively different from the one
Hobbes would later proffer. Bodin examined the relationship between the lawgiver—what we would now call the state—and the law,
and in particular whether the lawgiver was “sovereign” in the sense of
not being bound by the law. Bodin concluded that the lawgiver was
indeed above—that is, not bound by—some human law. At the same
following” despite a “general hostility” toward his views), in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HOBBES’S LEVIATHAN 413 (Patricia Springborg ed., 2007).
79
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 109 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1994)
(1651).
80
PHILIP PETTIT, MADE WITH WORDS: HOBBES ON LANGUAGE, MIND, AND POLITICS
127 (2008).
81
Id; cf. NORBERTO BOBBIO, THOMAS HOBBES AND THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION
165 (Daniela Gobetti trans., 1993) (noting “Hobbes’s particular thesis that it pertains
to the sovereign to determine the content of natural laws”). Machiavelli, though engaged in a different project, comes close to Hobbes on the lawgiver’s complete independence from antecedent law. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:
FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 160-61
(1975) (noting that the legitimacy of Machiavelli’s innovating prince does not necessarily depend upon law).
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time, however, Bodin’s definition of sovereignty was not the same as
the definition Hobbes would later adopt, which stated that the prince
82
Indeed, as Kenneth
or government is not subject to higher law.
Pennington has demonstrated beyond cavil, for Bodin, the relation
between the lawgiver and higher law is quite the opposite: the human
lawgiver, though “sovereign” in the sense of not being bound by all
83
human laws, remains bound by higher law. Though commentators
frequently miss the point, Bodin is unmistakably clear about the sovereign human lawmaker’s subordination to higher law:
[T]hese doctors do not say what absolute power is. For if we say that to
have absolute power is not to be subject to any law at all, no prince of
this world will be sovereign, since every earthly prince is subject to the
laws of God and of nature and to various human laws that are common
84
to all peoples.

Bodin continues,
Hence, those who state it as a general rule that princes are not subject to
their laws, or even to their contracts, give offense to God unless they
make an exception for the laws of God and of nature and the just con85
tracts and treaties that princes have entered into . . . .

If sovereignty sometimes means the ruler’s complete independence
from all law (unless, until, and for as long as the sovereign agrees to
be bound by it), it assuredly did not mean that for Bodin or the tradi86
tion he continued. The more expansive meaning of governmental
87
power came later, first with Hobbes and then with others.
82

In contrasting the two definitions of sovereignty, Perez Zagorin noted that,

Bodin’s treatise, which exerted a wide influence, was included in the Hardwick Library and was familiar to Hobbes, who cited it in The Elements of Law to
support his argument that the rights of sovereignty are indivisible. . . . Despite
the amplitude of his conception of sovereignty, [Bodin] qualified its powers in
several respects. Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty, in contrast, was clarity itself
and logically consistent as an analytic deduction from his understanding of
the nature and function of government. It differed from Bodin’s, moreover,
in that his sovereign as supreme power and commander was not subject to any
legal limits in the state that it ruled.
PEREZ ZAGORIN, HOBBES AND THE LAW OF NATURE 68 (2009).
83
KENNETH PENNINGTON, THE PRINCE AND THE LAW 1200–1600: SOVEREIGNTY
AND RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 276-83 (1993).
84
JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY 10 ( Julian H. Franklin ed. & trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1992) (1576).
85
Id. at 31-32.
86
Alison LaCroix seems to overlook this point when discussing Bodin in her otherwise excellent book THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note
60, at 13 & 225 n.5. One of the particular strengths of LaCroix’s account is its recogni-
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The sovereign governor’s claim to be above the law, moreover, has
now been all but conferred on the “governed”—those who were previously governable. These changes have not been unrelated. “Liberty
of the sovereign was as much outside the philosophy of the Middle
Ages as was radical liberty of the individual. The period during which
emancipation of the individual made progress was the same as that in
88
which emancipation of the sovereign was achieved.” Wilson was a
man ahead of his time when, as we have seen, he propounded at the
University of Pennsylvania the normative principle that every person is
an “original sovereign,” such that unless and until she puts herself
under law, she cannot be bound by law. Today, under Lawrence, sovereignty has become a judicially enforceable claim for individuals to be
something approaching self-norming. Barnett has on his side both the
thrust of much modern intellectual history and the Supreme Court of
the United States when he contends that we begin from individual so89
vereignty and a “presumption of liberty,” meaning that the individual
is presumptively ungoverned.
As Barnett himself concedes, however, the presumption of individual liberty is a conditional claim that one can rebut. Even Barnett
does not deny that government can and should refuse some attempts
by individuals to assert their “liberty,” namely, those who would cause
“harm.” Individuals are not, therefore, meaningfully sovereign—
unless that term means only that individuals are subject to legal regu-

tion that the creators of American federalism drew on a long tradition of discussion of
sovereignty and related concepts. Id. at 12-16. Patrick Thomas Riley also provides an
outstanding account. See generally Patrick Thomas Riley, Historical Development of the
Theory of Federalism, 16th–19th Centuries (1968) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Harvard University) (on file with Pusey Library, Harvard University).
87
The struggle to locate “sovereignty” was considerable. See OTTO GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY: 1500 TO 1800, at 40-44 (Ernest Barker trans.,
Beacon Press 1957) (1913) (discussing the debate over whether the people or the ruler
was possessed of sovereignty). Catholic social thought in the mid-twentieth century
struggled with whether to reject the concept of “sovereignty,” as Maritain had insisted
it should, or instead to attempt to cabin it, as Johannes Messner and Heinrich Rommen did. See generally JOHANNES MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS: NATURAL LAW IN THE
WESTERN WORLD 574-629 ( J.J. Doherty trans., 1965); HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE
STATE IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT 397-410 (1945). Harold Laski preceded Maritain in outright rejecting the “sovereignty” of the state. See HAROLD J. LASKI, STUDIES IN THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY 1-25 (1917).
88
BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, SOVEREIGNTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POLITICAL GOOD
192 ( J.F. Huntington trans., 1957).
89
See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY 253-69 (2004) (advocating for protection of enumerated and unenumerated
rights).
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lation only when they are in fact subject to legal regulation. Nor are
the people writ large meaningfully sovereign: they are subject to valid
laws of general applicability. Are the states meaningfully sovereign?
They are subject to valid regulation by the national government. Is
the nation sovereign? It is subject to the norms of international law.
It is also, at least arguably, subject to the norms of higher law—the
contention and condition Hobbes set out to deny.
IV. TRANSFORMING THE POLITICO-LEGAL CULTURE AWAY FROM
COMPETING “SOVEREIGNS”
This last point, about the bearing of higher law on government,
expands the context in which to evaluate the individual mandate.
Barnett wants us—indeed, wants the Supreme Court—to begin from a
presumption of liberty and, what he takes to be its correlate, a presumption against regulation. Leaving aside for the moment the unstated justifications for those presumptions, however, we should note
that a presumption in favor of liberty does not itself entail an absence
of regulation. For example, some individuals may not be “free” to be
healthy unless they obtain medical care. These same individuals may
not be able to obtain medical care unless they have health insurance.
And they may on occasion not have health insurance unless regulations compel them to buy it. The category of “liberty” is not exhausted by negative liberty, or freedom from interference; it also in91
cludes positive liberty, or freedom to act or be in a certain way. The
freedom to be healthy may be enhanced by regulation, and this apparently is what Congress thought when it passed PPACA.

90

The libertarian left rarely faces the governmental arbitrariness that is entailed
by giving legal effect to revisable selves. Discussing the Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey dictum that “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s
own concept of existence,” 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992), Russell Hittinger argues that
[t]here may well be a kernel of moral truth in the Casey dictum, but as it
stands the “right” is under-specified. Until it is further specified, no one can
know who is bound to do (or not do) what to whom. And so long as that condition persists, there is no limit to the government. On the one hand, we have
a principle of unbounded individual liberty; on the other, a government responsible for enforcing that principle in a very arbitrary manner.
RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE: REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL LAW IN A POSTCHRISTIAN WORLD 130 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
91
See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY 30-54, 216-17 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002) (defending negative liberty against government claims on behalf of positive liberty). On what
this distinction between negative and positive liberty means for Hobbes in particular,
see generally QUENTIN SKINNER, HOBBES AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY (2008).
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Even if that is indeed what Congress was thinking, as the legislative history suggests, Congress’s regulatory activity on behalf of health
immediately collides with our general views on the role of government, or at least our government, and, correlatively, ourselves. As William Eskridge and John Ferejohn have recently registered in A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution, the dominant model of
constitutionalism in America today is one in which judges construe
the Constitution to protect only negative rights. “The biggest shortcoming of America’s judge-centric Constitution,” Eskridge and Ferejohn write, “is its seeming emphasis on negative rights or, in common
92
parlance, its libertarianism.” While not denying that there has been
a long Anglo-American tradition of limiting government’s role in protecting negative liberty, predating even the framing and ratification of
our Constitution, Eskridge and Ferejohn observe that “[t]he Supreme
Court has focused Constitutionalism upon negative rights and governmental limits—much more than is justified even by the classic
93
‘liberal’ political philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes.”
This is an intriguing claim, and its meaning turns in part on what
is involved in “justifying” what we do with, or under, our Constitution.
Without questioning the existence of the libertarian strand of our socio-political culture and what it might mean for constitutional interpretation, Eskridge and Ferejohn call attention to the other strands of
that culture and what they in turn should mean for such interpretation. In particular, they contend that “superstatutes” form part of our
94
nation’s “fundamental law,” alongside the Constitution itself. PPACA
was passed after A Republic of Statutes went to press, but Eskridge and
Ferejohn do include the Medicare Act of 1965 as an example of a statutory commitment to a positive benefit that has become entrenched
95
as part of America’s fundamental law.
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s elegant and controversial argument—
that statutes and the administrative schemes they launch should be
treated on par with the Constitution—defies summary here. What it
establishes, though, at a minimum, is that there is a mainstream argument that highlights the ways in which our legal regime already—
and largely without controversy—treats the people not as presumptively “sovereign,” but instead as properly the subject of some regula92

ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 31, at 43.
Id.
94
Id. at 8, 42.
95
See id. at 196-98 (providing a brief history of the enactment of the Medicare Act
of 1965).
93
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96

tion that confers positive liberties. Even if such regulation is arguably inconsistent with the original meaning of the Constitution, Eskridge and Ferejohn argue, we should now treat it as functionally
amending the Constitution, in part because the procedures for formal
amendment are too cumbersome to be carried out except in excep97
tional circumstances.
No one could plausibly think that the Constitution as originally
understood included a right to adequate medical care, but when
Franklin Delano Roosevelt announced a Second Bill of Rights in his
State of the Union Address, on January 11, 1944, he asserted just such
a right. Eskridge and Ferejohn note that “FDR did not believe these
rights,” including the right to adequate medical care, “were already in
98
the Constitution, nor did he seek an Article V amendment.” Rather,
they continue,
[h]is project was to recognize these affirmative rights as fundamental
commitments that a democratic government should be making to its citizens; FDR’s deeper project was to perfect the Lockean state and recast
government legitimacy as resting on its capacity to create structures allowing every American to create a flourishing life—the concrete starting
point for the consumerist constitution that has governed our country for
the past two generations. The primary mechanism for Roosevelt’s grand
99
project was superstatutes.

The names of many of those statutes passed in the 1930s, such as the
Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1935 and the Social Security Act of
1935, are familiar to students of American history and law. As mentioned above, Congress passed the Medicare Act thirty years after the
100
passage of the Social Security Act. And, needless to say, it took until
just last year for Congress to enact legislation aimed at a comprehen-

96

Id. at 43-48.
See id. at 48-51 (characterizing the Constitution as “old, short, and hard to amend”
and noting that “its intractable process for updating . . . has generated an amendment
rate for the U.S. Constitution that is much lower than for any state constitution”).
98
Id. at 46.
99
Id.
100
Discussing Lyndon B. Johnson’s “Great Society,” Morton Keller has noted that it
97

was as representative of late-twentieth-century America and the populistbureaucratic regime as the New Deal was of Depression America. It was fed
not by depression or war but by a growing demand for rights by spokesmen of
previously deprived groups and by a heightened concern for the quality of life
in a mature industrial society: products of the affluent, booming post-war years.
MORTON KELLER, AMERICA’S THREE REGIMES: A NEW POLITICAL HISTORY 225 (2007).
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sive guarantee of the seventh right enumerated by FDR: the right “to
101
adequate medical care” and “good health.”
Barnett contends that a fatal defect in the individual mandate is
that there is no “pre-existing duty” on the part of individuals to act,
102
even for their own health.
There was indeed no legal duty prior to
the passage of the mandate, but are duty and obligation exhausted by
positive law? Yes, if we begin with Barnett’s splendidly simple presumption of liberty and assign a purely or largely negative role for the
state. But we need not begin with that presumption, as Eskridge and
Ferejohn have demonstrated. As times change, the positive obligations of government and the correlative positive rights of the governed can change too. Civic republicans, such as Eskridge and Fere103
Moreover, those who approach the
john, affirm this proposition.
question of the role of government from a moral perfectionist point of
view in ethics should also affirm this proposition and affirm that it is the
role of government to provide for those who do not provide for themselves. This may be paternalistic, but that is no argument against it.
Still, someone may object, ours is a written constitution meant to
endure the ages without alteration except through the mechanisms of
amendment provided in Article V: our Constitution enumerates and
thus limits the realm of legally enforceable rights. As mentioned, Eskridge and Ferejohn have specifically denied this normative argument
about Article V’s position as the exclusive mechanism for amendment.
They argue instead that we should read “superstatutes,” such as PPACA, as de facto constitutional amendments, sources of new rights and
104
duties of the highest positive-law order. Whether or not one agrees

101

ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 31, at 46.
Barnett, supra note 8, at 634.
103
See also Vivienne Brown, Self-Government: The Master Trope of Republican Liberty,
84 MONIST 60, 71-72 (2001) (arguing that “republican liberty is distinct both from the
notion of liberty as ‘freedom from’ actual or potential interference, and from the notion of liberty as ‘freedom to’”).
104
See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 31, at 6-9, 18. For a forceful argument
that the only way to amend the Constitution is through Article V, see John R. Vile, Legally Amending the United States Constitution: The Exclusivity of Article V’s Mechanisms, 21
CUMB. L. REV. 271, 271-72 (1991), which describes the two methods for amending the
Constitution, both of which require Article V. See also Henry Paul Monaghan, We the
People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121,
148 (1996) (“Examining the available writings to the extent that I . . . could, I can find
no evidence—none at all—for the proposition that Article V was understood not to be
the exclusive method of amendment because of an overriding and widely shared conception of national popular sovereignty.”). For a defense of “common law” techniques
of enforcing new constitutional positive rights, see generally Helen Hershkoff, “Just
102
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with that sentiment, the prospect of giving a nonoriginalist meaning
to the Constitution reflects a cautionary point I raised at the outset.
There are deep reasons to be wary of originalism in the absolutist way
it is often understood.
V. QUESTIONS MORE FUNDAMENTAL THAN ASSERTIONS OF
“SOVEREIGNTY”
One of the remarkable facts about constitutional originalists is
that they are only sometimes originalists about the objects of their political affection. The focus here, sovereignty, is perhaps the most glaring
example of originalists’ selectivity. Even though originalists sometimes disagree about the definition of originalism, they do all agree
that it includes a close attention to the words of the Constitution. As
we have seen, however, “sovereignty” does not make even a passing
appearance in the Constitution, let alone as a property of the nation,
the states, the people, individuals, or tribes. The originalist arguments
in favor of sovereignty can only be defended on originalist grounds, so
without words from which to argue, originalists must turn to original
purposes of the Constitution.
But if it is legitimate to consider the purposes behind the Constitution where there are no enacted words to guide us in discerning
those purposes, then a fortiori we should consider the Constitution’s
purposes as well where there are words to guide us. Some might counter by appealing to the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
which in this context would mean that words preempt purposes. This
should be so, however, only if those who framed and ratified the Constitution wished their words to be treated as exhausting their purposes. But why would we, in turn, agree to be bound by a document that
we cannot integrate into purposive human living? Many originalists,
Justice Antonin Scalia among them, will answer this last question by
arguing that the very point of any written constitution, including our
105
own, is to establish an unchanging legal bedrock.

Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional Social and Economic Rights,
62 STAN. L. REV. 1521 (2010).
105
See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws (“There is plenty of room for
disagreement as to what original meaning was, and even more as to how that original
meaning applies to the situation before the court. But the originalist at least knows
what he is looking for: the original meaning of the text.”), in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 45 (Amy Guttman ed., 1998).
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The question, though, is whether we can properly do just that. Can
we humans properly write a text and agree to bind ourselves to it,
come what may? In other words, is it morally permissible for us to be
106
If, as Justice Wilson conabsolutists about a written constitution?
tended, we are “original sovereigns,” then the answer is presumably
yes: it is the privilege of an original sovereign to do what he or she
will, including in concert with other original sovereigns. If, however,
we start from the judgment that we have an indefeasible moral obligation to set up good government in order to meet our human needs
and worthy aspirations, then the question of the tenability of an “unchangeable” constitution alters. Humans operating under a moral obligation to set up worthy government can bind themselves to a text only to the extent that doing so is a prudent way of achieving the ends of
good governance. What is prudent will vary from time to time and
place to place. This variability is the locus of the creative tension to
107
which I referred at the beginning.
We come, then, to a fundamental decision about who we think we
are, and it is on the basis of this decision that some of our most basic

106

Of course, the Constitution avoids absolutism of a sort by providing for its own
amendment, but Eskridge and Ferejohn make a strong case that those mechanisms are
so cumbersome as to render the Constitution functionally close to unamendable. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 31, at 49-50. More important, however, is that having a
written constitution does not entail that all that is “constitutional” in a particular nation can be found within that constitution and the case law construing it. The current
transformation of the British Constitution demonstrates aspects of the creative tension
I have in mind. “The truth is that constitutions . . . are never—repeat, never—written
down in their entirety, so the fact that Britain lacks a capital-C Constitution is far less
important than is often made out.” ANTHONY KING, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 5
(2007). What is part of the constitution, therefore, will be the legitimate subject of
ongoing debate. Even Parliament’s pretensions to sovereignty are subject to rejection—a development with lessons worthy of export. See Stephen Sedley, On the Move,
LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 8, 2009, at 3, 3-5 (chronicling the emergence of a new
rule of recognition in British constitutionalism).
107
It is beyond my current purpose to provide much more detail about what I
mean by a creative tension. It is sufficient to note that individuals under an indefeasible obligation to create and enforce good governance cannot use texts to absolve
themselves of that obligation. I should underscore, however, that in morally heterogeneous cultures such as our own, prudence may well counsel in favor of stricter judicial discipline which, in turn, flirts with the absolutism that is anathema. The history of
constitutionalism is the story of how to limit government power while also keeping it in
service of the people, their goods, and their rights. See, e.g, CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN (1947) (providing a history of the
development of constitutionalism). For an especially insightful account of how a range
of constitutional orders, including our own, are maintained and updated through interpretation, see WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND
MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL ORDER 460-96 (2007).
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choices about the law’s scope must be made. Are we “original sove108
reigns?” Or are we, instead, under a moral obligation to set up worthy structures of government in order to achieve the good life for
humans? The latter is the perspective of the natural law tradition,
which has been neither completely dominant in nor completely ab109
And those who affirm this
sent from American political discourse.
principle as true—those who believe that we are under a higher law
obligation to seek the good life, including through good government
and good laws—will view themselves as morally obligated, in an indefeasible way, to struggle against those who would be absolutists about
texts, or would assert a “presumption of liberty” and leave it at that.
Texts, including constitutional texts, should serve worthy human purposes, and those purposes may sometimes require government aid rather than a laissez-faire libertarianism. Interestingly, the somewhat
more expansive view of government’s role, to which the traditional
understanding of the natural law leads, tends to align its adherents
more with the contemporary American left than with the contemporary American right, at least on some important matters (though certainly not on others).
I will not attempt to answer here whether the individual mandate
is in fact a prudent legislative response to a perceived human prob110
lem. My aim has been to show why the argument that the mandate
violates individual sovereignty assumes answers to metaphysical ques108

In her Gifford Lectures, Jean Elshtain argues for the “less-than-sovereign self”
on the basis of (among other grounds) our gendered dependency, our vulnerability,
and our interrelatedness. JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, SOVEREIGNTY: GOD, STATE, AND
SELF 159-80, 227-45 (2008). Among the book’s many virtues, it establishes how questions about sovereignty always involve, at least implicitly, tradeoffs among claims about
God, the state, and the human person. Human vulnerability and dependence need to
be at the center—not the margin—of political theory. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES 1-11 (1999).
109
For a compendious account, see Robert P. Kraynak, Catholicism and the Declaration of Independence: An American Dilemma about Natural Rights, in MARITAIN AND AMERICA 1-30 (Christopher Cullen & Joseph Allan Clair eds., 2009). The classic account,
which is in need of an update, is CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL
LAW CONCEPTS: A STUDY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OF THE INTERPRETATION OF LIMITS ON LEGISLATURES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CERTAIN
PHASES OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1930). John Hart Ely acknowledges
some of the historical role of natural law argument in American constitutionalism but
concludes prematurely that it is “discredited” and “no longer respectable.” JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 48-52 (1980).
110
A forceful criticism of an insurance-based means of meeting the moral obligation to ensure adequate health care to all is presented in JOHN C. MÉDAILLE, TOWARD
A TRULY FREE MARKET: A DISTRIBUTIST PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT,
TAXES, HEALTH CARE, DEFICITS, AND MORE 207-22 (2010).
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tions that Barnett does not provide.
Barnett and his supporters
must argue for the claim that we are original sovereigns, not merely
assert it. The natural law claim that we are not sovereign but are instead obligated to seek the good life, including through the creation of
government that is at the service of the people, also requires argu112
This much is beyond dispute, however: “[W]hen we return
ment.
to a conception of sovereignty that recognizes norms outside the
state’s positive law, we shall be returning to a system of thought that
113
In this, I submit, we should take
has deep roots in Western law.”
some real satisfaction, though Barnett would probably disagree.
Meanwhile, “[t]he only obstacles in the way of [sovereignty’s] indefinite growth are three orders of laws, all of which came to be abrogated
by three historical facts: irreligion, legal positivism and sovereignty of
114
the people.”

111

At times, Barnett justifies his “presumption of liberty” as no more than a construction—as opposed to an interpretation, following Keith Whittington’s distinction—
of the Constitution. See Paulsen & Barnett, supra note 15, at 275-76 (Barnett, Discussion) (stating that he does “not claim that the presumption of liberty is an interpretation of the Constitution” and is instead only a “construction”). When Barnett offers a
modestly more ambitious argument in favor of natural rights that protect liberty, he
does so with the condition that we “want a society in which people can pursue happiness.” BARNETT, supra note 89, at 82. The natural law tradition, by contrast, does not
rest natural rights on the mercurial contingency of what individuals “want.” On a related point, Barnett states that “[n]atural law ethics or ‘natural right’ is a method of
assessing the propriety of individual conduct.” Id. Classical proponents of natural law
and natural right, however, would hardly find their position recognizable in this question-begging caricature. For them, the natural law and natural right govern everything
for the common good, which includes but is not exhausted by individual goods. On the
priority of the common good in the natural law tradition, see Charles De Koninck, The
Primary of the Common Good Against the Personalists, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF CHARLES DE
KONINCK 63-164 (Ralph McInerny ed., 2009).
112
This will be the burden of my forthcoming book, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE
GOOD: AN ESSAY ON LAW, AUTHORITY, AND THE CHURCH (forthcoming 2013). I have
argued for this proposition before. See, e.g., Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Place of
“Higher Law” in the Quotidian Practice of Law: Herein of Practical Reason, Natural Law,
Natural Rights, and Sex Toys, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL. 437, 442 (2009) (“Natural law and
the natural rights that derive from it . . . are all about what is concretely good for humans and their communities . . . .”).
113
PENNINGTON, supra note 83, at 290.
114
DE JOUVENEL, supra note 88, at 185.

